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Abstract	  During	  its	  long	  history	  from	  antique	  hand-­‐operated	  instruments	  to	  modern	  information	  processing	  automata	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  machine	  has	  several	  times	  received	  a	  shift	  in	  meaning.	  Today	  the	  concept	  of	   the	   machine	   has	   completely	   lost	   its	   attachment	   to	   any	   concrete	   material	   and	   is	   instead	  characterized	   by	   its	   functional	   behavior.	   Symbolic	   machines,	   i.e.	   the	   mathematical	   idea	   to	  mechanically	   operate	   with	   symbols,	   became	   a	   fundamental	   skill	   in	   many	   different	   scientific	  disciplines.	  In	  this	  paper	  we	  take	  a	  look	  on	  synthetic	  biology	  from	  the	  computational	  point	  of	  view	  and	  especially	  address	  the	  question	  whether	  it	  will	  once	  more	  challenge	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  machine.	  One	  obvious	  consequence	  of	  future	  biotechnologies	  is	  that	  we	  cannot	  any	  longer	  draw	  a	  strict	  line	  between	   technique	   and	   life.	   In	   the	   past	   machines	   did	   not	   assemble,	   maintain	   and	   reproduce	  themselves,	   they	   had	   to	   be	   fabricated	   by	   man	   and	   required	   human	   monitoring	   and	   directing.	  Through	   the	   technical	   use	   of	   biological	   processes	   this	   hallmark	   of	   the	   living	   becomes	   untenable.	  Self-­‐strategies	   and	   especially	   self-­‐referential	   functional	   descriptions	   like	   self-­‐assembly,	   self-­‐reproduction,	   and	   self-­‐modification	   are	   at	   the	   center	   of	   the	   convergence	   of	   the	   natural	   and	   the	  artificial.	  Conversely	  the	  adoption	  of	   life-­‐like	  qualities	  by	  technical	  artifacts	  will	  also	  challenge	  our	  image	  of	  life	  and	  organisms	  and	  our	  understanding	  of	  what	  aliveness	  could	  mean.	  	  Keywords:	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  self-­‐reproduction,	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1.	  The	  notion	  of	  the	  machine	  	  According	  to	  Lewis	  Mumford	  [1]	  machines	  have	  been	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  our	  technical	  heritage	  for	  the	   last	   three	   thousand	   years.	   “Machine”	   first	   referred	   to	   simple	   machines	   of	   classical	   antiquity,	  levers,	  wedges,	  wheels,	  winches,	  pulleys,	  screws	  and	  inclined	  planes,	  and	  combinations	  of	  them.	  But	  Mumford	  points	  out	  that	  although	  the	  Chinese,	  the	  Arabs,	  the	  Greeks,	  the	  Egyptians,	  and	  the	  Romans	  took	  the	  first	  steps	  towards	  the	  machine	  they	  did	  not	  develop	  the	  machine.	  By	  the	  machine	  Mumford	  refers	   to	   the	   entire	   and	   mutually	   dependent	   technological	   complex,	   which	   includes	   physical	  knowledge	  and	  technical	  and	  cultural	  skills	  as	  well	  as	  the	  entire	  spectrum	  of	  technical	  artifacts	  like	  utensils,	  apparatus,	  utilities,	  tools,	  and	  machines.	  He	  complains	  that	  the	  role	  of	  utility	  and	  apparatus	  has	   been	   neglected	   in	   most	   discussions	   of	   the	   machine	   and	   the	   development	   of	   our	   modern	  environment.	  Within	  this	  broader	   image	  of	  the	  machine,	  Mumford	  also	  cites	  the	  definition	  of	  what	  we	  today	  call	  the	  classical	  mechanic	  machine	  and	  which	  was	  introduced	  in	  1876	  by	  Reuleaux	  in	  his	  book	   The	   Kinematics	   of	   Machinery:	   Outlines	   of	   a	   theory	   of	   Machines	   (see	   [1]):	   “A	   machine	   is	   a	  combination	  of	  resistant	  bodies	  so	  arranged	  that	  by	  their	  means	  the	  mechanical	  forces	  of	  nature	  can	  be	  compelled	  to	  do	  work	  accompanied	  by	  certain	  determinant	  motions”.	  In	  this	  definition	  the	  work	  conducted	  by	  the	  machine	  can	  still	  depend	  on	  human	  power.	  Machines	  that	  use	  external	  sources	  of	  power	  Mumford	  calls	  automatic	  machines.	  For	  him	  the	  basic	  distinction	  between	  a	  machine	  and	  a	  tool	  lies	  not	  in	  the	  question	  where	  the	  driving	  force	  comes	  from	  but	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  independence	  in	  the	  operation	  from	  the	  skills	  and	  directive	  of	  humans.	  Mumford’s	  classification	  of	  basic	  types	  of	  artifacts	  has	  been	  taken	  up	  later	  and	  slightly	  modified	  by	  Carl	  Mitchum	  [2].	  He	  especially	  introduces	  the	  difference	  between	  machines	  and	  automata.	  Mitchum	  subdivides	  machines	  from	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  energy	  into	  four	  classes:	  (1)	  machines	  that	  depend	  on	  human	  or	  animal	  power,	  (2)	  machines	  that	  employ	   direct	   mechanical	   energy	   from	   nature,	   (3)	   machines	   that	   create	   their	   own	   mechanical	  energy	   from	   heat,	   and	   (4)	   machines	   that	   use	   some	   sort	   of	   abstract	   energy.	   This	   differentiation	  reflects	  the	  chronological	  development	  of	  machines	  and	  the	  development	  of	  our	  abstract	  concept	  of	  energy.	  While	  only	  the	  first	  type	  of	  machines	  requires	  human	  energy	  input	  the	  others	  use	  external	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sources	  of	  power.	  The	   last	   two	   categories	  have	  been	   further	   subdivided	   into	   those	  machines	   that	  generate	  or	   transform	  energy	  and	   those	   that	   transmit	  power	  and	  perform	  work.	  But	  all	  machines	  still	   require	   human	   direction	   while	   the	   concept	   of	   automata	   (or	   cybernetic	   machines)	   requires	  neither	  human	  energy	  input	  nor	  immediate	  human	  direction.	  Automated	  devices	  feed	  parts	  of	  their	  output	  back	  into	  the	  device	  itself	  and	  use	  it	  as	  a	  form	  of	  control.	  	  The	  notion	  of	  the	  machine	  was	  always	  directly	  connected	  to	  the	  technological	  developments	  of	  the	  related	  time.	  It	  successively	  had	  to	  be	  extended	  to	  keep	  pace	  with	  actual	  technological	  skills	  and	   practices	   and	   had	   always	   to	   unite	   the	   old	   and	   the	   new	   types	   of	  machines.	   Although	  we	   still	  produce	  and	  use	  mechanical	  devices,	   the	  classic	  mechanical	  machine	  concept	   is	  outdated	  and	  had	  long	  ago	  being	  extended	  to	   include	  new	  technical	   facts.	  Reuleaux’s	  concept	  was	  formulated	  before	  the	  advent	  of	  electrical,	  chemical	  and	  nuclear	  energies.	  Our	  current	  machine	  concept	  is	  compared	  to	  former	  notions	  more	  abstract	   in	  at	   least	  three	  respects.	  Firstly,	   it	   is	  abstracted	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  driving	   power	   of	   the	   machines.	   The	   concept	   of	   energy	   allows	   the	   consideration	   of	   the	   different	  forms	   of	   power	   producing	   and	   power	   consuming	   machines	   under	   the	   same	   abstract	   notion.	  Secondly,	   we	   realized	   that	   machines	   are	   not	   bound	   to	   any	   physical	   material	   but	   can	   better	   be	  characterized	   by	   its	   functional	   behavior.	   This	   equalization	   of	   varying	   material	   solutions	   of	   a	  machine	  is	  only	  possible	  through	  the	  mediating	  role	  of	  formal	  sign	  systems,	  which	  are	  used	  for	  the	  precise	   notation	   of	   its	   spatial,	   temporal,	   and	   logical	   behavior.	   Today	   only	   those	   proficiencies	   are	  built	   into	   industrially	   produced	  machines,	   which	   before	   have	   been	   formalized	   in	   different	  multi-­‐layered	  symbolic	  descriptions.	  Formal	  sign	  systems	  are	  the	  central	  tool	  within	  the	  current	  concept	  of	   the	   machine	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   Mumford.	   Thirdly,	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   machine	   is	   abstracted	   with	  respect	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  information	  processing.	  The	  work	  machines	  perform	  can	  be	  physical	  work	  as	   well	   as	   intellectual	   work.	   The	   following	   definition	   from	   the	   cyberneticist	   Georg	   Klaus	   [3]	  demonstrates	   the	   transformation	   that	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   machine	   went	   through	   because	   of	   the	  advent	  of	  information	  processing	  machines:	  	  	  “Machine:	   any	   instrument,	   any	   device,	   any	   system	   that	   processes	   a	  certain	  input	  (respectively	  certain	  types	  of	  inputs)	  to	  a	  certain	  output	  (respectively	   certain	   types	   of	   output).	   Under	   this	   viewpoint	   any	  machine	   is	   identical	   with	   the	   material	   model	   of	   a	   certain	  transformation.	   This	   generalization	   of	   the	   classical	   notion	   of	   the	  machine	   is	   necessary	   if	  machines	   for	   processing	  materials,	  machines	  for	  generating	  certain	  forms	  of	  energy	  from	  other	  forms	  of	  energy	  and	  for	   transferring	   energy,	   as	   well	   as	   machines	   for	   generating,	  transferring,	   and	   storing	   of	   information	  want	   to	   be	   brought	   together	  under	  one	  generic	  term.”1	  	  	  This	  definition	  of	  the	  machine	  as	  an	  input-­‐output-­‐device	  is	  almost	  indistinguishable	  from	  the	  most	  general	  definition	  of	  a	  system	  provided	  by	  system	  theory.	  The	  only	  difference	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  the	  machine	  still	  needs	  some	  sort	  of	  material	   realization,	  on	   the	  other	  hand	   the	  actual	  material	   is	  not	  important	  as	  long	  as	  it	  fulfills	  its	  designated	  function.	  Although	  already	  by	  the	  16th	  century,	  Western	  technology	  had	  reached	  a	   level	  where	   tools	  and	  machines	  began	   to	   show	   lifelike	   characteristics,	   there	  was	   always	   a	   clear	  divide	  between	   the	  natural	  and	  the	  technical.	  While	  living	  systems	  were	  self-­‐replicating	  and	  self-­‐maintaining,	  machines	  did	  not	  assemble	  and	  reproduce	  themselves,	  they	  had	  to	  be	  fabricated	  by	  man	  and	  required	  human	  monitoring	  and	  directing.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  consider	  the	  interrelations	  between	  machines	  and	  biology	  we	  have	  to	  analyze	  organisms,	  which	  are	  the	  primary	  units	  of	  life.	  The	  two	  notions	  organism	  and	  life	  are	  at	  the	  center	  of	  theoretical	  foundations	  of	  biology.	  Essential	  processes	  of	  life,	  like	  reproduction,	  metabolism,	   behavior,	   self-­‐maintenance	   and	   regulation	   are	   qualities	   of	   organisms.	   Interestingly	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Laubichler	  [4]	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  newly	  framed	  and	  formalized	  concept	  of	  organism	  will	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  biology	  of	  the	  21st	  century.	  	  The	  concept	  of	  function	  in	  biology	  is	  racked	  up	  with	  technical	  functions,	  e.g.	  as	  of	  parts	  of	  machines	  or	  of	  artifacts,	  which	  are	  linked	  to	  intentionality	  and	  teleology.	   For	   Laubichler	   the	   intended	   formal	   notion	   of	   organism	   will	   be	   the	   starting	   point	   for	  mathematical	   models	   and	   theoretical	   reflections	   especially	   in	   evolutionary-­‐,	   developmental-­‐,	  immuno-­‐	   and	   neurobiology.	   He	   also	   refers	   to	   the	   problem	   that	   the	   newly	   propagated	   notion	   of	  organism	  has	  the	  problem	  to	  distinguish	  itself	  from	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  system	  and	  also	  puts	  the	  question,	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  at	  all,	  and	  if	  so,	  does	  it	  matter?	  So	  biology,	  as	  well	  as	  technology,	  seems	  to	  be	  approaching	  a	  more	  and	  more	  abstract	  and	  formal	  notion	  of	   the	  machine	  resembling	  that	  of	  the	   system.	   This	   points	   to	   another	   meta-­‐theory,	   since	   system	   theory	   has	   strong	   connections	   to	  Wiener’s	   cybernetics.	   Norbert	   Wiener’s	   approach	   explicitly	   tried	   to	   explain	   communication	   and	  control	   in	   the	   living	   and	   the	  machine	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   same	   abstract	  mechanisms.	   Cybernetics	  from	   the	   beginning	   also	   dealt	   with	   similarities	   between	   living	   systems	   and	   machines.	   With	   the	  concentration	  on	  questions	  of	  autonomy,	  cognition,	  self-­‐organization,	  and	  especially	  the	  role	  of	  the	  observer	   in	   modeling	   a	   system	   in	   the	   1970s,	   the	   term	   second-­order	   cybernetics	   was	   established.	  Meanwhile	   the	   core	   ideas	   of	   cybernetics	   have	   been	   assimilated	   by	   other	   disciplines.	   Along	   these	  lines	  artificial	   life	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   updated	   version	   of	   questions	   asked	   in	   2nd	   order	   cybernetics.	  Christopher	  Langton,	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  field,	  defined	  artificial	  life	  as	  follows	  [5]:	  	  	   “Artificial	   Life	   is	   the	   study	   of	   man-­‐made	   systems	   that	   exhibit	  behaviors	   characteristic	   of	   natural	   living	   systems.	   It	   complements	  the	   traditional	   biological	   sciences	   concerned	   with	   the	   analysis	   of	  living	   organisms	   by	   attempting	   to	   synthesize	   life-­‐like	   behaviors	  within	   computers	   and	   other	   artificial	   media.	   By	   extending	   the	  empirical	   foundation	   upon	   which	   biology	   is	   based	   beyond	   the	  carbon-­‐chain	   life	   that	   has	   evolved	   on	   Earth,	   Artificial	   Life	   can	  contribute	   to	   the	   theoretical	   biology	   by	   locating	   life-­as-­we-­know-­it	  within	  the	  larger	  picture	  of	  life-­as-­it-­could-­be”.	  	  	  This	  approach	  views	  life	  as	  a	  property	  of	  the	  organization	  of	  matter,	  rather	  than	  a	  property	  of	  the	  matter	  itself.	  The	  way	  we	  describe	  organizational	  principles	  today	  are	  formal	  sign	  systems.	  	   Recapitulating	  the	  first	  section	  there	  are	  three	  points	  to	  emphasize:	  1.	  The	  key	  characteristic	  of	  machines	  compared	  to	  other	  technical	  artifacts,	  like	  for	  example	  tools,	  is	  their	  independence	  from	  human	  directive.	  All	  machines	  seek	  for	  non-­‐reflective	  repeatability.	  A	  formerly	  achieved	  insight	  into	  a	   process	   or	   chain	   of	   thoughts	   is	   functionalized	   and	   thereby	   accessible	   to	   technical	   realization.	  Within	  this	  process	  formal	  models	  and	  symbolic	  descriptions	  are	  very	  handy	  ways	  of	  functionalizing	  insight.	   2.	   The	   material	   basis	   of	   the	   machine	   is	   secondary	   compared	   to	   its	   logical	   from.	   The	  advancing	  abstraction	  of	  control	  mechanisms	  for	  machines	  has	   let	   to	  the	   insight	   that	   the	  essential	  qualities	  of	  any	  control	  structure	  can	  be	  captured	  within	  systems	  of	  abstract	  rules.	  Thus	  the	  modern	  equivalent	   of	   the	  machine	   are	   formalized	   procedures,	   i.e.	  algorithms.	   3.	   In	   biology	   there	   is	   also	   a	  clear	  tendency	  to	  describe	  organisms	  and	  live	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  formal	  models.	  The	  concept	  of	  function	  in	  biology	  is	  amalgamated	  with	  technical	  functions	  like	  that	  of	  machines.	  In	  the	  field	  of	  artificial	  life	  this	   leads	   to	   the	   assumption	   that	   life	   can,	   like	   it	   was	   shown	   for	  machines,	   be	   separated	   from	   its	  material	  basis	  and	  aliveness	  consequently	  is	  then	  a	  property	  of	  the	  logical	  form.	  The	   following	   sections	   of	   the	   paper	   will	   concentrate	   on	   some	   of	   the	   key	   principles	   for	  biological	   machines	   and	   the	   formal	   models	   that	   allow	   for	   the	   algorithmic	   description	   of	   life-­‐like	  qualities.	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2.	  Symbolic	  machines	  and	  universal	  computers	  	  During	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  abstraction	  of	  the	  logical	  form	  of	  the	  machine	  was	   laid.	  Arithmetic	  and	  mathematics	   in	  general	  were	   finally	  recognized	  as	  a	  mechanical	  process	  of	  dealing	  with	  sign	  systems.	  Computability	  theory	  at	  this	  time	  asked	  questions	  like:	  what	  can	   be	   effectively	   automated?	   Or	   the	   other	   way	   around:	   can	   we	   formulate	   problems,	   which	   are	  unsolvable	   by	   any	  machine	   in	   any	   conceivable	   programming	   language?	   To	   give	   answers	   to	   these	  questions	  formal	  descriptions	  have	  been	  developed	  of	  what	  we	  precisely	  mean	  by	  a	  problem	  or	  by	  an	   effective	   procedure	   that	   solves	   the	   problem.	   These	   formal	   operational	   models	   of	   effective	  procedures	   are	   called	   algorithms.	   Our	   current	   notion	   of	   algorithms	   mainly	   goes	   back	   to	  mathematical	  works	  of	  several	  people	  during	  the	  1930s,	  e.g.	  Alan	  Turing,	  Alonzo	  Church,	  Kurt	  Gödel,	  and	  Emil	  Post.	  Meanwhile	  a	  vast	  number	  of	  formal	  models	  are	  available	  that	  all	  have	  turned	  out	  to	  be	   equivalent	   in	   their	   fundamental	   computing	   capabilities.	   Despite	   considerable	   differences	   in	  formalism,	  they	  all	  share	  some	  common	  characteristics:	  (1)	  effective	  procedures	  are	  composed	  of	  a	  series	  of	  elementary	  steps,	  which	  are	  executed	  one	  by	  one,	   (2)	  only	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  different	  types	  of	  elementary	  operations	  is	  needed,	  (3)	  each	  operation	  as	  well	  as	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  next	  are	  absolutely	  deterministic.	  From	  the	  theoretical	  point	  of	  view	  nothing	  else	   is	  necessary	  to	  construct	  the	  whole	  computational	  universe.	  For	  efficiency	  reasons	  a	  series	  of	  additional	  concepts	  have	  been	  developed	   to	   support	   the	   description	   and	   realization	   of	   reliable	   and	   reusable	   complex	  computational	  systems.	  Most	  important	  is	  the	  encapsulation	  of	  series	  of	  elementary	  operations	  and	  its	   operands	   to	   new	   elementary	   units	   and	   the	   nesting	   of	   these	   units	   in	   hierarchies.	   From	   this	  abstract	  viewpoint,	  algorithms	  are	  a	  very	  general	  concept,	  applicable	  to	  any	  operation	  cycle	  in	  craft,	  industry,	   or	   organizations,	   except	   that	   in	   the	   strict	   sense	   of	   an	   algorithm	   we	   demand	   a	   formal	  description	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  ambiguities.	  	  A	   model	   that	   is	   easy	   to	   understand	   and	   structurally	   close	   to	   real-­‐world	   computers	   is	   the	  
random	   access	   machine	   (RAM),	   which	   is	   an	   abstract	   model	   from	   the	   class	   of	   so	   called	   register	  
machines.	  The	  original	  definition	  of	  random	  access	  machines	  goes	  back	  to	  Sheperdson	  and	  Sturgis	  in	  1963	  [6].	  The	  following	  set	  of	  operations	  is	  just	  one	  possible	  version,	  in	  literature	  many	  alternative	  sets	  of	  elementary	  operations	  have	  been	  described.	  The	  basic	  element	  is	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  cells,	  where	  each	  cell	   is	  a	  memory	  unit	  that	  consists	  of	  a	   location	   (specified	  by	  an	  index)	  and	  content	   (a	  natural	  number).	  The	  following	  set	  of	  elementary	  operations	  might	  be	  defined	  over	  the	  cells:	  	  Operations	  on	  cells	  1)	   Ai	  =	  0;	  	  	  	  	   	   //	  set	  value	  of	  cell	  Ai	  to	  zero	  2)	   Ai	  =	  Ai	  +	  1;	   	   //	  increase	  value	  of	  cell	  Ai	  3)	   Ai	  =	  Ai	  -­	  1;	   	   //	  decrease	  value	  of	  cell	  Ai	  4)	   while	  (Ai	  !=	  0)	  {	  	   //	  loop	  condition	  ...	  ...	  do	  some	  operations	  of	  type	  1-­‐4	  ...	  
}	  	  	   The	  hardware	  of	  a	  RAM	  consists	  of	  a	  sufficient	  amount	  of	  cells	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  elementary	   operations.	   A	   RAM-­‐program	   consists	   of	   a	   specific	   linear	   sequence	   of	   elementary	  operations.	   The	   while-­‐operator	   is	   the	   central	   controlling	   construct	   that	   allows	   for	   a	   nonlinear	  execution	  of	  the	  program.	  Depending	  on	  the	  intermediate	  content	  of	  the	  cells	  while	  the	  calculation	  is	  performed,	   operations	   of	   the	   program	   are	   executed	   or	   skipped.	   A	   random	  access	   stored	  program	  
machine	  (RASP)	  is	  a	  RAM	  that	  holds	  the	  data	  as	  well	  as	  the	  program	  in	  the	  cells.	  In	  this	  general	  case	  the	  machine	  is	  equivalent	  to	  the	  Universal	  Turing	  machine	  and	  very	  close	  to	  the	  description	  of	  the	  von	  Neumann	  architecture,	  our	  practical	  model	  of	  computers.	  To	  solve	  a	  certain	  problem	  by	  writing	  a	  RAM-­‐program	  requires	  the	  deliberate	  decision	  about	  any	  single	  step	  the	  machine	  will	  eventually	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perform.	   Despite	   the	   great	   advancements	   in	   programming	   languages,	   e.g.	   object-­‐oriented	  approaches	  or	  genetic	  programming,	  high-­‐level	  descriptions	  are	  still	   (e.g.	  by	  the	  compiler)	  broken	  down	  to	  a	  sequence	  of	  elementary	  operations.	  On	  the	  machine	  level	  nothing	  will	  happen	  that	  is	  not	  exactly	   and	   repeatably	   determined	   in	   the	   program	   code.	   Malfunction	   on	   the	   programming	   level	  always	  means	  errors	  in	  reasoning	  or	  the	  human	  translation	  of	  reasoning	  into	  the	  algorithm,	  not	  in	  hardware.	  	   The	  most	   important	   feature	   of	   computational	  models	   is	   the	   separation	   of	   the	  machine	   in	  
hardware	   and	   software.	   The	   data	   as	   well	   as	   the	   operations	   are	   represented	   as	   symbols.	   The	  hardware	  of	  the	  machine	  is	  endowed	  with	  specific	  properties	  that	  enable	  it	  to	  read	  and	  perform	  the	  operations	  and	  thereby	  manipulate	  the	  stored	  data.	  The	  programmer	  is	  responsible	  for	  selecting	  the	  appropriate	   elementary	   operations	   to	   perform	   a	   certain	   task.	   This	   means,	   that	   there	   are	   three	  players	   in	  the	  game	  of	  computation:	  human	  thinking,	   formal	  systems,	  and	  material	  (hardware).	   In	  our	   classical	   model	   the	   formalisms	   (mathematics,	   text,	   programs)	   and	   human	   thinking	  (mathematical	  reasoning,	  problem	  analysis,	   interpretation	  and	  handling	  of	   input/output	  relations)	  are	  the	  flexible	  constituents	  while	  the	  hardware	  is	  the	  fixed	  and	  invariant	  part	  of	  computation.	  The	  strength	  of	  the	  universal	  machine,	  having	  a	  rigid	  hardware	  and	  the	  necessary	  flexibility	  for	  solving	  different	   tasks	   on	   the	   same	  machine	   to	   the	   software,	   was	   already	   described	   by	   Alan	   Turing,	   the	  inventor	  of	  this	  concept	  [7]:	  	  	   “The	  importance	  of	  the	  universal	  machine	  is	  clear.	  We	  do	  not	  need	  to	   have	   an	   infinity	   of	   different	   machines	   doing	   different	   jobs.	   A	  single	   one	   will	   suffice.	   The	   engineering	   problem	   of	   producing	  various	  machines	  for	  various	  jobs	  is	  replaced	  by	  the	  office	  work	  of	  ‘programming’	  the	  universal	  machine	  to	  do	  these	  jobs.”	  	  	  A	  Universal	  Machine	  is	  a	  machine,	  which	  is	  able	  to	  read	  the	  description	  of	  any	  other	  machine	  and	  to	  execute	   this	   description.	   So	   the	   Universal	   Machine	   can	   simulate	   any	   other	   machine.	   All	   modern	  computers	  are	  Universal	  Machines.	  Their	  operating	  system	  allows	  them	  to	  load	  or	  edit	  programs	  and	  execute	   them.	   Since	   the	   program	   as	   well	   as	   the	   data	   are	   both	   coded	   as	   symbols,	   the	   Universal	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3.	  Biology	  and	  computation	  	  The	   rigidity	   of	   pre-­‐produced	   and	   fixed	   hardware,	   which	  was	   assumed	   by	   the	   RAM	  model	   or	   the	  Turing	   Machine	   is	   given	   up	   in	   the	   case	   of	   biological	   machines.	   The	   execution	   of	   a	   calculation	   is	  becoming	  a	  material	  process	  of	  self-­‐assembling.	  After	  half	  a	  century	  of	  experience	  with	  the	  stepwise	  deterministic	   models	   of	   computation,	   different	   practical	   limitations	   of	   the	   approach	   have	   been	  recognized.	  Despite	  their	  theoretical	  universality,	  digital	  electronic	  circuits	  are	  inflexible	  by	  design.	  Once	  implemented	  they	  can	  not	  evolve	  or	  adapt	  to	  changing	  conditions	  and	  tasks,	  which	  often	  leads	  to	   time,	   resource,	   and	   energy	   inefficient	   solutions.	   Computer	   architectures	   based	   on	   the	   classical	  model	   of	   sequential	   processing	   are	   also	   not	   best	   suited	   for	   handling	   problems	   with	   nonlinear	  complexity	  in	  time	  and	  memory.	  Synthetic	  biology,	  with	  its	  fluid	  scalable	  hardware,	  intends	  to	  offer	  new	   opportunities	   to	   overcome	   the	   limitations	   of	   the	   classic	   models	   of	   computation	   (see	   for	  example	   [8]).	   Also	   the	   traditional	   algorithmic	   methodology	   was	   already	   strongly	   influenced	   by	  principles	   that	   have	   been	   learned	   by	   watching	   nature,	   evolutionary	   computing,	   artificial	   neural	  networks,	  swarming	  behavior,	  and	  L-­‐Systems	  are	  just	  a	  few	  examples.	  Thus	  biology	  and	  technology	  not	  only	  met	  in	  certain	  practices,	  they	  always	  shared	  the	  need	  for	  common	  perspectives	  and	  formal	  operational	  models.	   Although	   there	   have	   always	   been	   productive	   connections	   between	   computer	  science	   and	   the	   science	   of	   biology,	   the	   targeted	   dynamization	   of	   hardware	   in	   the	   field	   of	  biomolecular	   computing	   will	   probably	   change	   our	   practical	   understanding	   of	   computation	   and	  finally	   our	   theoretical	   notion	   of	   algorithms.	   The	   theoretical	   Turing-­‐border	   of	   computation	  might	  also	   hold	   for	   biological	  machines,	   this	   question	   is	   still	   highly	   controversial.	   Although	   research	   in	  biological	   computation	   is	   still	   in	  a	   state	  of	   laboratory	  experimentation,	   the	   relevance	  of	  biological	  processes	   and	   the	  qualities	  of	  biological	  materials	   for	   computing	  has	   always	  been	   recognized	  and	  formulated	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  automated	  computing.	  In	  this	  paper	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  not	  the	  computing	  capabilities	  of	  biological	  materials	  are	  at	  the	  center	  of	  biological	  computing	  but	  the	  theoretical	  models	  of	  self-­‐reference.	  	  To	   get	   a	   general	   idea	   of	   some	   principles	   of	   biological	   machines	   we	   look	   at	   some	   concrete	  examples,	  without	  going	  into	  detail:	  (1)	  bacterial	  computer	  that	  solve	  the	  Hamiltonian	  Path	  Problem,	  (2)	  slime	  moulds	  that	  find	  the	  shortest	  path	  in	  a	  maze,	  (3)	  biologically	  inspired	  robotics,	  and	  (4)	  the	  multitudinous	  field	  of	  cyborg	  technologies,	  which	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  discussed	  under	  the	  aspect	  of	  the	  biological	  machine.	  (1)	   The	  mathematical	   Hamiltonian	   Path	   Problem	   (HPP)	   asks	  whether	   there	   is	   a	   sequence	   of	  vertices	  in	  a	  directed	  graph	  from	  a	  starting	  nod	  to	  an	  ending	  node,	  where	  each	  node	  is	  only	  allowed	  being	  visited	  exactly	  once.	  Scientists	  have	  succeeded	  to	  program	  bacteria	  with	  a	  genetic	  circuit	  that	  enables	  them	  to	  evaluate	  all	  possible	  paths	  in	  a	  directed	  graph	  in	  order	  to	  find	  a	  Hamiltonian	  path	  [9].	  The	  design	  of	  the	  bacteria	  needs	  several	  steps	  of	  abstraction	  of	  a	  DNA	  sequence	  into	  the	  edges	  and	  nodes	  of	  a	  Hamiltonian	  path.	   In	  this	  special	  mapping,	  DNA	  segments	  are	  treated	  as	  edges	  of	  a	  directed	  graph.	  Nodes,	  except	  the	  terminal	  one,	  are	  treated	  as	  genes	  split	  into	  two	  halves.	  The	  first	  half	  of	  the	  gene	  is	  found	  on	  any	  DNA	  edge	  that	  terminates	  at	  the	  node,	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  gene	  is	  found	  on	  any	  DNA	  edge	  that	  originates	  at	  the	  node.	  Each	  node	  of	  the	  graph	  is	  represented	  by	  a	  gene	  that	  encodes	  an	  observable	  phenotype,	  for	  example,	  fluorescence.	  Bacterial	  colonies	  that	  contain	  an	  HPP	   solution	   will	   express	   a	   unique	   combination	   of	   phenotypes	   that	   can	   be	   detected	   directly	   or	  found	  by	  selection	  (for	  details	  see	  [9]).	  The	  number	  of	  permutation	  of	  edges	  in	  a	  graph	  grows	  very	  fast	   with	   the	   number	   of	   edges.	   For	   a	   graph	   with	   n	   edges	   there	   is	   a	   total	   of	   n!•2n	   possible	  configuration	  of	  edges.	  The	  growing	  computational	  complexity	   is	  encountered	  by	  an	  exponentially	  growing	   number	   of	  processing	  elements.	   The	   homogeneous	   population	   of	   bacteria	   constitutes	   the	  computer.	  A	  growing	  bacterial	  colony	  will	  produce	  a	  vast	  number	  of	  different	  edge	  configurations.	  But	  we	  never	  can	  be	  sure	   that	  a	  HPP	  solution	  will	  be	  part	  of	   the	  growing	  colony.	  The	  authors	   [9]	  show	   that	   for	   a	   99.9%	   security	   of	   finding	   an	  HPP	   solution	   in	   a	   graph	  with	   14	   edges,	   at	   least	   one	  billion	   independent,	   identically	   distributed	   bacteria	   are	   needed,	   which	   can	   in	   principle	   grow	  overnight	  in	  a	  single	  culture.	  Thus,	  the	  creation	  of	  mutating	  bacteria	  is	  used	  to	  solve	  a	  mathematical	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problem.	  	  (2)	   A	   group	   of	   plasmodial	   slime	   moulds	   has	   been	   extensively	   interpreted	   in	   terms	   of	  computation.	   It	  has	  been	  shown	  that	   this	  primitive	  organism	  has	   the	  ability	   to	  solve	   the	  shortest-­‐path	  problem	  between	  two	  points	  in	  a	  maze.	  If	  food	  is	  placed	  at	  different	  points	  of	  a	  maze	  the	  slime	  mould	  will	  adapt	  its	  tubular	  channels	  between	  the	  points	  while	  foraging	  the	  food	  sources.	  Recently	  is	   has	   been	   shown	   for	   the	   Tokyo	   rail	   system	   that	   the	   slime	  mold	   Physarum	  polycephalum	   forms	  networks	  with	  comparable	  efficiency,	  fault	  tolerance,	  and	  cost	  to	  those	  of	  real-­‐world	  infrastructure	  networks	   [10].	   The	   adaptive	   process	   of	   the	   growing	   slime	   mould	   has	   also	   been	   mathematically	  described	  by	  a	  feedback	  mechanism.	  (3)	  Machines	  are	   typically	  bad	   in	  adapting	   to	  partial	   failure	  or	  unexpected	  damage.	  Normally	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  machine	  collapses	  and	  the	  system	  sustains	  complete	  failure.	  Animals	  on	  the	  other	   hand	   develop	   qualitatively	   new	   compensatory	   behaviors	   when	   confronted	   with	   the	   same	  situation.	  Therefore	   robotics	   tries	   to	  develop	  machines	   that	   also	   can	   recover	   from	  disorders.	  One	  crucial	   element	   in	   this	   form	   of	   adaption	   is	   to	   facilitate	   continuous	   self-­‐modeling.	   In	   [20]	   a	   four-­‐legged	   machine	   uses	   actuation-­‐sensation	   relationships	   to	   indirectly	   infer	   its	   own	   structure.	  Subsequently	  it	  can	  use	  this	  self-­‐model	  to	  generate	  forward	  locomotion.	  When	  parts	  of	  the	  machine	  are	  removed,	  the	  self-­‐model	  is	  automatically	  aligned	  and	  alternative	  gaits	  are	  generated.	  (4)	   Since	   the	   construction	   of	   very	   small	   flying	   machines	   that	   perform	   really	   well	   in	   natural	  environments	   is	   an	   extremely	   difficult	   task,	   scientists	   came	   up	  with	   the	   idea	   to	   use	   the	   amazing	  flight	   skills	   of	   insects	   and	   try	   to	   remote	   control	   their	   movement	   in	   space.	   Results	   from	  neurophysiology	   and	   dynamics	   of	   insect	   flight	   together	   with	   the	   ongoing	   miniaturization	   of	  electronic	  circuits	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  low	  power	  radio	  systems	  has	  led	  to	  development	  of	  a	  new	  class	   of	   implantable	   interfaces	   capable	   of	   controlling	   insects	   in	   free	   flight	   for	   extended	   periods.	  Recently	   several	   groups	  have	   started	   to	  explore	   the	  advantages	  of	   interfaces	   implanted	   in	   insects	  during	  pupation	  [21]:	  „Beyond	  the	  issue	  of	  control,	  insects	  which	  undergo	  complete	  metamorphosis	  may	   present	   a	   unique	   system	   with	   which	   to	   study	   synthetic-­‐organic	   interfaces.	   […]	   Given	   the	  extensive	   re-­‐working	   of	   the	   insect	   physiology	   during	   pupation,	   it	   is	   tempting	   to	   hypothesize	   that	  interfaces	   inserted	   during	   this	   period	   could	   somehow	   co-­‐opt	   the	   developmental	   processes	   for	   an	  engineering	  advantage”.	  NP-­‐hard	  problems	   like	   the	  described	  Hamiltonian	  Path	  Problem	  are	  a	   convenient	   application	  area	  for	  biological	  computing	  because	  they	  demonstrate	  how	  computational	  processes	  can	  be	  speed	  up	   by	   the	   use	   of	   biological	   growth	   processes	   which	   are	   naturally	   fast.	   From	   the	   viewpoint	   of	  programming	  a	  classic	  computer	  like	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  RAM	  or	  a	  Turing	  Machine,	  the	  task	  could	  be	  summarized	  as	  follows:	  “How	  to	  design	  a	  set	  of	  elementary	  operations	  so	  that	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  end-­‐states	   will	   be	   reached.”	   In	   molecular	   programming,	   the	   same	   task	   is	   reformulated	   and	  described	  quite	  differently	  (e.g.	  [11]):	  "How	  to	  design	  a	  set	  of	  initial	  molecules	  so	  that	  a	  certain	  type	  of	   molecular	   complexes	   will	   be	   formed."	   This	   means	   a	   tremendous	   change	   in	   constructing	   and	  handling	  computational	  machines.	  The	  programmer	  of	  biological	  machines	  no	  longer	  concentrates	  on	  finding	  the	  correct	  sequence	  of	  elementary	  operations,	  but	  rather	  on	  the	  proper	  preparation	  of	  a	  self-­‐controlled	   biological	   process.	   The	   involved	   biological	   mechanisms	   are	   non-­‐terminating,	  massively	  parallel,	   stochastic,	   self-­‐referential,	   adaptive,	   and	   self-­‐modifying.	   In	   the	  past	   there	  have	  been	  many	   attempts	   to	   extend	   the	   classical	   von	  Neumann	   Architecture	   to	   achieve	   some	   of	   these	  qualities.	   But	   in	   terms	   of	   efficiency	   the	   results	   are	   still	   very	   poor.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   massive	  parallelism,	   adaption	   and	   self-­‐modification	   are	   inherent	   qualities	   of	   biological	   systems.	   But	   these	  qualities	  are	   in	  conflict	  with	   the	  classic	  algorithmic	  approach	  of	   stepwise	  determinism,	  where	   the	  place	  and	  duration	  of	  any	  single	  operation,	  and	  thereby	  the	  whole	  machine	  activity,	   is	  under	  total	  control.	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4.	  The	  formalization	  of	  life	  	  The	   German	   engineering	   scientist,	   Franz	   Reuleaux	   developed	   a	   symbolic	   notation	   for	   the	  classification	  of	  machines	  already	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  [12]:	  	  	   “In	   contrast	   to	   the	   physical	   sciences	   of	   mechanics	   and	  electromagnetism,	   where	   natural	   laws	   were	   codified	   with	  mathematical	   equations,	   in	   chemistry	   and	   biology	   attempts	   were	  made	   to	   classify	   the	   objects	   of	   these	   sciences	   with	   tables	   and	  abstract	  notation.”	  	  	  One	  of	  Franz	  Reuleaux’s	  unique	  contributions	  to	  kinematics	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  symbolic	  language	  with	  which	  to	  classify	  a	  machine.	  The	  syntax	  for	  kinematic	  devices,	  which	  he	  proposed	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  synthesis	  is	  a	  language	  for	  machine	  invention.	  In	  his	  quest	  for	  an	  alphabet	  of	  machine	  devices,	  Reuleaux	  built	  the	  world's	  largest	  collection	  of	  machine	  components,	  a	  dictionary	  of	  sorts	  of	  over	  800	  models.	  Using	  his	  symbolic	  system,	  along	  with	  his	  models,	  Reuleaux	  sought	  to	  deconstruct	  every	  machine	  that	  had	  been	  or	  would	  be	  invented	  in	  the	  future,	  a	  “Genome	  project	  for	  the	   Machine	   Age.”	   But	   a	   general	   system	   to	   classify	   machines	   is	   not	   sufficient	   if	   we	   want	   the	  machines	  to	  realize	  themselves.	  As	  explained	  at	  the	  beginning	  Reuleaux	  machine	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  resistant	  bodies	  so	  arranged	  that	  by	  their	  means	  the	  mechanical	  forces	  of	  nature	  can	  be	  compelled	  to	  do	  work	   accompanied	  by	   certain	  determinant	  motions.	  Defining	   reproduction	  on	   a	  mechanical	  basis	  means	  that	  we	  have	  to	  describe	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  machine	  as	  a	  fabric	  of	  modifiable	  parts	  and	  that	  this	  structure	  is	  able	  by	  itself	  to	  repeatedly	  reconstruct	  the	  relations	  of	  the	  parts	  to	  one	  another.	  One	  possible	  strategy	  is	  to	  introduce	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  mediator	  a	  symbolic	  description	  of	  the	  machine	  and	  a	  mechanical	  system	  that	  is	  able	  to	  read	  and	  execute	  this	  plan	  in	  a	  self-­‐controlled	  manner.	  	  	   In	  mathematical	  terms	  the	  simplest	  form	  of	  self-­‐reference	  is	  a	  variable	  y	  that	  is	  mapped	  by	  a	  function	  f	  onto	  itself.	  	  	   y	  =	  f(y)	  	  or	  in	  the	  iterated	  discrete	  version	  	   yt+1	  =	  f(yt)	  	  Thereby	  the	  variable	  y	  and	  the	  function	  f	  can	  stand	  for	  different	  types	  of	  circularities.	  The	  variable	  can	  for	  example	  model	  a	  voltage	  in	  a	  closed	  electric	  circuit	  or	  an	  image	  in	  a	  video	  feedback,	  where	  a	  camera	  points	  to	  it	  own	  image	  shown	  on	  a	  monitor.	  The	  output	  (data)	  of	  some	  transformation	  is	  fed	  back	  into	  system	  as	  next	  input.	  These	  types	  of	  self-­‐reference	  are	  well	  examined	  in	  chaos	  theory	  and	  self-­‐organization.	  The	  transformation	  f	  is	  in	  this	  case	  fixed,	  only	  the	  data	  is	  subject	  of	  transformation.	  	  Self-­‐assembling	  systems	  mark	  a	  different	   field	  of	  self-­‐referential	  problems.	  Here	  the	  structure	  (hardware)	  of	  the	  system	  itself	  is	  subject	  of	  alteration.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  establish	  a	  process	  that	  starts	  with	  some	  simple	  elements	  and	  ends	  with	  a	   functioning	  artifact	   that	   implements	  certain	  qualities.	  The	   basic	   physical	   characteristics	   of	   such	   self-­‐assembling	   artifacts	   are	   described	   by	   Pelesko.	  According	  to	  him	  the	  four	  key	  components	  of	  self-­‐assembly	  in	  nature	  are	  [13]:	  	  
Structured	   particles	   –	   These	   are	   the	   basic	   assembling	   elements.	   Their	   structure	   restricts	   the	  complexity	  of	  the	  resulting	  system.	  Often	  the	  internal	  structure	  of	  the	  particles	  can	  be	  modified	  be	  external	  stimuli	  and	  thereby	  offers	  a	  mean	  of	  controlling	  the	  process.	  
Binding	  forces	  –	  These	  are	  the	  typically	  reversible	  forces	  that	  hold	  the	  assembling	  elements	  together.	  Changing	  the	  binding	  forces	  offers	  a	  second	  variable	  to	  control	  the	  process	  of	  self-­‐assembling.	  
Environment	   –	   That	   is	   the	   total	   conditions	   where	   structured	   particles	   live	   in.	   Altering	   the	  environment	  is	  a	  third	  means	  of	  controlling	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  system.	  
Driving	  forces	  –	  The	  driving	   force	   is	  usually	   thought	  of	   as	  noise.	   Its	  presence	  makes	   sure	   that	   the	  particles	  can	  interact	  stochastically.	  This	  stochastic	  interaction	  is	  the	  central	  principle	  that	  compels	  the	  system	  to	  move	  through	  different	  configurations	  on	  its	  way	  to	  a	  final	  state.	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  This	  general	  characterization	  of	  self-­‐assembling	  processes	  holds	  for	  microstructures	  like	  biological	  cells	   and	  bacteria	  as	  well	   as	   for	  macrostructures	   like	  magnetic	  units	  arranged	  on	  a	   table.	  We	  will	  typically	   find	   these	   components	   in	   many	   biological	   based	   computing	   systems,	   e.g.	   the	   above-­‐described	  solution	  for	  the	  Hamilton	  -­‐Path	  -­‐Problem.	  In	  the	  earlier	  sections	  of	  the	  article	  it	  was	  stated	  that	   formal	   principles	   and	   self-­‐reference	   are	   at	   the	   center	   of	   organisms	   and	   living	   creatures.	  Therefore	   it	  must	   be	  possible	   to	   substitute	  Pelesko’s	   physically	   oriented	   self-­‐assembly	  by	   a	  more	  general	   formal	   description.	   The	   problem	   of	   self-­‐assembly	   is	   strongly	   connected	   to	   problems	   we	  know	   from	   bootstrapping	   complex	   systems.	   The	   basic	   figure	   of	   bootstrapping	   is,	   that	   while	   the	  system	  is	  booting	  more	  and	  more	  complex	  functions	  are	  becoming	  available.	  The	  process	  starts	  with	  just	   the	  basic	  capability	   that	   is	  necessary	  to	  build	   the	  next	  a	   little	  bit	  more	  sophisticated	   function.	  This	  function	  then	  is	  used	  to	  build	  other	  functions	  and	  so	  on.	  Self-­‐replication	  or	  self-­‐reproduction	  is	  another	  form	  of	  self-­‐reference.	  In	  his	  famous	  book	  Gödel,	  
Escher,	   Bach	   –	   An	   Eternal	   Golden	   Braid,	   Douglas	   R.	   Hofstadter	   [16]	   emphasized	   the	   parallels	  between	  mechanisms,	  which	  allow	  systems	  to	  reproduce	  themselves	  and	  mechanisms,	  which	  create	  self-­‐reference.	  Hofstadter	  extensively	  examines	  quines,	   named	  after	   the	  American	   logician	  Willard	  van	  Orman	  Quine.	  Quines	   are	   self-­‐replicating	   formal	   sign	   systems,	   especially	   computer	  programs,	  which	  print	  its	  own	  listings.	  The	  existence	  of	  quines	  in	  any	  Turing	  complete	  programming	  language	  is	   ensured	   by	   the	   fixed-­‐point	   theorem,	   which	   is	   itself	   an	   instance	   of	   Cantor’s	   famous	   diagonal	  argument.	  When	  a	  quine	  program	  is	  run	  on	  a	  computer,	  it	  must	  precisely	  print	  its	  own	  instructions	  without	   accessing	   the	   source	   file.	   In	   most	   programming	   languages	   it	   is	   also	   not	   possible	   to	  manipulate	  its	  own	  textual	  representation.	  Therefore	  to	  write	  a	  quine	  we	  have	  to	  use	  the	  two	  usual	  elements	  of	  programming,	  which	  we	   call	  data	   and	   instructions.	   The	   idea	  behind	   the	   realization	  of	  quines	   can	   best	   summarized	   by	   the	   syntactic	   construct	   “write	   ‘write’	   ”.	   In	   terms	   of	   programming	  language	   the	  word	  write	   plays	   the	   role	   of	   instructions	   and	   the	  word	   ‘write’	   (in	   quotation	  marks)	  plays	  the	  role	  of	  data.	  The	  data	  of	  a	  quine	  represents	  the	  code	  and	  therefore	  can	  be	  directly	  derived	  from	  the	  code,	  mainly	  by	  putting	  quotation	  marks	  around	   it.	  During	   the	  execution	  of	   the	  program	  the	  data	  is	  used	  twice.	  First	  the	  code	  uses	  the	  data	  to	  print	  the	  code.	  Then	  the	  code	  uses	  the	  data	  to	  print	   the	   data.	   This	   second	   string	   can	   be	   obtained	   from	   the	   first	   by	   a	   simple	   algorithmic	  transformation.	  The	  following	  program	  is	  an	  executable	  quine	  written	  in	  the	  programming	  language	  processing.	  When	  it	  is	  run	  it	  exactly	  prints	  the	  lines	  it	  consists	  of.	  
	  
void	  setup()	  {	  char	  a=34;	  	  
String	  h,	  g;	  	  
h	  ="void	  setup()	  {	  char	  a=34;	  String	  h,	  g;	  h	  =";	  
g	  ="print(h+a+h+a+';'+'g'+'	  '+'='+a+g+a+';'+g);}";	  
print(h+a+h+a+';'+'g'+'	  '+'='+a+g+a+';'+g);}	  	   But	   computing	   processes	   that	   involve	   growth	   and	   reproduction	   of	   elements	   (bacteria	   in	   the	  example	  above)	  usually	  cannot	  entirely	  satisfactory	  being	  explained	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  self-­‐assemblage.	  From	   the	   standpoint	   of	   organizational	   complexity	   self-­‐assembly	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   weaker	   challenge	  then	   self-­‐reproduction.	   Models	   of	   self-­‐replication	   or	   of	   self-­‐assembly	   as	   described	   above	   do	   not	  necessarily	  need	  an	  explicit	  construction	  plan,	  as	  the	  material	  oriented	  description	  of	  Pelesko	  shows.	  It	  can	  be	  a	  result	  of	  material	  dynamics	  embedded	  in	  a	  suitable	  environment.	  In	  living	  beings,	  on	  the	  other	   hand,	   the	  DNA	   is	   carrying	   the	   genetic	   information	   of	   the	   organism.	  Today	  we	   interpret	   the	  DNA	   as	   part	   of	   a	   construction	   plan.	   Using	   this	   sort	   of	   description	   for	   machines	   means	   that	   the	  machine	  has	  to	  contain	  within	  itself	  an	  explicit	  description	  of	  its	  own	  construction.	  Turing’s	  notion	  of	   the	   universal	   computer	   gave	   John	   von	  Neumann	   the	   idea	   that	   there	  might	   be	   an	   equivalent	   to	  universal	   computation	   on	   the	   construction	   side.	   He	   asked	   for	   the	   logic	   principles	   of	   a	   universal	  constructor,	   i.e.	   a	   machine	   that	   can	   build	   any	   other	   machine.	   Von	   Neumanns	   theory	   of	   self-­‐
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reproducing	  automata	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  precursor	  of	  a	  formal	  theory	  of	  growth	  and	  reproduction.	  By	  a	  constructor	  A	  we	  mean	  a	  machine,	  which,	  when	  furnished	  with	  a	  suitable	  description	  I(N),	  will	  construct	   a	   copy	   on	  N.	   But	  we	   have	   to	   do	  more	   to	   achieve	   a	   universal	   constructor.	  A	   is	   not	   self-­‐reproducing,	  since	  A	  attended	  with	  a	  description	  A(I(A))	  will	  surely	  produce	  a	  copy	  of	  A,	  but	  not	  a	  copy	  of	   the	  description	   I(A).	   So	   the	   reproduction	   cycle	   is	   not	   self-­‐contained	   and	  will	   already	   stop	  after	   the	   first	   construction	   step.	   The	   newly	   constructed	   machine	   will	   not	   itself	   start	   to	   produce	  descendants.	  To	  correct	  this	  defect	  von	  Neumann	  suggested	  the	  following	  complex	  of	  machines	  A,	  B,	  and	  C	  together	  with	  their	  descriptions	  I(A),	  I(B),	  and	  I(C)	  [see	  for	  example	  14]:	  
	  
Construction	  machine	  A	  Function:	  feed	  A	  with	  I(X)	  and	  you	  will	  get	  	  X	  	  
Copy	  machine	  B	  Function:	  feed	  B	  with	  a	  description	  I1(X)	  and	  you	  get	  a	  copy	  I2(X)	  of	  the	  description	  	  
Control	  machine	  C	  Function:	  activates	  A(I(X)),	  activates	  B(I(X)),	  puts	  I(X)	   into	  newly	  build	  X	  and	  releases	  it	  to	  the	  world	  The	  Self-­reproducing	  machine	  E	  finally	  consists	  of	  the	  combination	  of	  these	  three	  machines	  
E	  =	  D	  +	  I(D)	  where	  D	  =	  A	  +	  B	  +	  C	  and	  I(D)	  	  =	  I(A	  +	  B	  +	  C	  )	  	  Von	  Neumann’s	   automaton	  was	   the	   first	   completely	  mechanical	   description	   of	   a	   self-­‐reproducing	  artifact	  without	   any	   regress	   to	   biology	   or	   even	   vitalism.	  His	   concept	   from	  1951	   is	   still	   important	  since	   its	   analogy	   to	   biology	   is	   obvious,	   including	   the	   important	   turn	   that	   biochemistry	   from	   this	  standpoint	   is	   only	   a	   special	   instance	   of	   a	   general	   model.	   Not	   the	   material	   itself	   or	   the	   material	  building	  blocks	   are	   crucial	   but	   the	   general	   principle	   of	   organization,	  which	   comprises	   a	   complete	  description	  of	  itself.	  We	  then	  can	  further	  ask	  where	  the	  description	  comes	  from.	  Instead	  of	  assuming	  a	  preexisting	  plan	  of	  the	  machine	  we	  can	  also	  develop	  machines	  that	  in	  a	  first	  step	  construct	  a	  self-­‐description	  and	  only	  then	  start	  to	  reproduce	  according	  to	  that	  construction	  plan.	  For	  kinematic	  self-­‐replicating	  machines	  Freitas/Merkle	  provides	  a	  comprehensive	  overview	  [17].	  	  The	  Hamilton-­‐Path-­‐Problem-­‐solving	  biological	  computer	  described	  above	  includes	  the	  growth	  and	   duplication	   of	   bacteria	   and	   thus	   can	   be	   analyzed	   under	   the	   aspect	   of	   self-­‐reproduction.	   By	  moving	   from	   computing	   that	   just	   uses	  DNA	   as	  material	   to	   living	   bacterial	   computers	   researchers	  expect	  several	  improvements	  [9]:	  „Programming	  bacteria	  to	  compute	  solutions	  to	  difficult	  problems	  could	  offer	  the	  same	  advantage	  of	  parallel	  processing	  that	  DNA	  computing	  brings,	  with	  the	  following	  additional	  desirable	  features:	  (1)	  bacterial	  systems	  are	  autonomous,	  eliminating	  the	  need	  for	  human	  intervention,	   (2)	   bacterial	   computers	   can	   adapt	   to	   changing	   conditions,	   evolving	   to	   meet	   the	  challenges	   of	   a	   problem,	   and	   (3)	   the	   exponential	   growth	   of	   bacteria	   continuously	   increases	   the	  number	  of	  processors	  working	  on	  a	  problem.“	   In	   the	   examples	  of	   the	  bacterial	   computer	   and	   the	  maze-­‐solving	   slime	  mould	   the	   self-­‐maintenance	   and	   growth	   of	   the	   system	   and	   its	   computational	  qualities	   are	   not	   separable	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   extended	   von	   Neumann	   self-­‐reproduction.	   The	  exponential	   growth	   of	   the	   bacteria	   respectively	   the	   growing	   slime	   mould	   are	   the	   computation.	  Computation	  and	  self-­‐replication	  are	  not	  separated	  but	  a	  merged	  procedure.	  The	  growth	  is	  part	  of	  the	  qualities	  of	  the	  biosystem	  while	  its	  computational	  qualities	  are	  externally	  imprinted	  by	  means	  of	  preparation	  of	  the	  system.	  	  At	   this	   point	   our	   notion	   of	   computation	   and	   of	   machines	   enters	   the	   realm	   of	   autopoiesis.	  According	   to	  Maturana	   and	   Varela	   “an	   autopoietic	  machine	   is	   a	  machine	   organized	   (defined	   as	   a	  unity)	   as	   a	   network	   of	   processes	   of	   production	   (transformation	   and	   destruction)	   of	   components	  which:	   (i)	   through	   their	   interactions	  and	   transformations	  continuously	   regenerate	  and	  realize	   the	  network	   of	   processes	   (relations)	   that	   produced	   them;	   and	   (ii)	   constitute	   it	   (the	   machine)	   as	   a	  concrete	  unity	  in	  space	  in	  which	  they	  (the	  components)	  exist	  by	  specifying	  the	  topological	  domain	  of	   its	   realization	   as	   such	   a	   network”	   [15].	   The	   aspect	   of	   autopoiesis,	   e.g.	   autonomous	   and	   self-­‐maintaining	  components	  that	  recursively	  reproduce	  themselves,	  is	  like	  self-­‐assembly	  not	  sufficient	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to	   explain	   the	   total	   capabilities	   of	   biological	   machines.	   Classical	   autopoietic	   systems	   have	   no	  apparent	   inputs	   or	   outputs.	   They	   don’t	   produce	   other	   things	   than	   themselves.	   While	   traditional	  machines	   like	   assembly	   lines	   or	   computers	   are	   allopoietic,	   which	   means	   they	   typically	   produce	  something	  different	   from	   themselves,	   for	  examples	  cars	  and	   furniture	   in	   the	  case	  of	   the	  assembly	  line,	  or	  information	  in	  the	  case	  of	  computers.	  To	  understand	  biological	  computation	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  self-­‐reproduction	  the	  machine	  therefore	  needs	  autopoietic	  as	  well	  as	  allopoietic	  qualities.	  John	  von	  Neumann’s	  self-­‐reproducing	  machines	  already	  comprise	  both	  aspects	  of	  production.	  His	  concept	  of	  self-­‐reproduction	  can	  easily	  be	  extended	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  machines	  that	  not	  only	  produce	  copies	  of	  themselves	  but	  also	  additional	  machines.	  To	  achieve	  that,	  we	  just	  have	  to	  feed	  the	  above-­‐described	  self-­‐reproducing	  machine	  with	  a	  description	  of	  itself	  together	  with	  a	  description	  of	  another	  machine.	  This	  extended	  machine	  will	  first	  reproduce	  itself	  and	  than	  construct	  the	  second	  machine	  implement	  a	  completely	  different	  function.	  With	   respect	   to	   qualities	   of	   biological	   organisms	   like	   self-­‐assembly,	   self-­‐reproduction,	   self-­‐maintenance,	   self-­‐repair,	   self-­‐improvement,	   and	   other	   self-­‐strategies,	   we	   still	   lack	   a	   deep	  understanding	  of	  the	  formal	  principles	  for	  these	  different	  constellations	  of	  self-­‐reference.	  We	  need	  a	  much	   broader	   basis	   of	   formal	   models	   and	   practical	   examples	   that	   explore	   the	   variety	   of	  configurations	  between	  symbolic	  descriptions	  and	  manageable	  material	  implementations.	  Although	  the	  central	   theoretical	  standpoint	  states	   that	   the	  discussed	   life-­‐like	  qualities	  are	  a	  result	  of	   logical	  organization	   principles	   and	   not	   of	   the	  material,	   for	   real	  machines	  we	   have	   to	   bring	   the	  material	  qualities	  and	  the	  logical	  construction	  into	  line.	  	  	  
5.	  Convergence	  of	  mechanic	  and	  biologic	  qualities	  	  In	  the	  previous	  sections	  we	  have	  concentrated	  on	  the	  shift	  of	  our	  image	  of	  the	  machine	  through	  the	  implementation	   of	   biological	   principles.	   But	   our	   understanding	   of	   organisms	  will	   conversely	   also	  shift	  through	  the	  application	  of	  mechanic	  principles	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  living.	  Similar	  to	  the	  research	  in	  artificial	   intelligence,	  which	  has	  changed	  our	  concept	  of	  human	  intelligence,	  the	  development	  of	  biological	  machines	  will	  change	  our	  image	  of	  the	  living.	  We	  have	  learned	  that	  the	  computer	  is	  able	  to	  reproduce	  certain	  logical	  operations	  and	  thereby	  is	  able	  to	  model	  particular	  mental	  work.	  But	  at	  the	  same	  time	  we	  understood	  that	  human	  thinking	  is	  able	  to	  transcend	  this	  form	  of	  thinking.	  A	  formal	  model	  for	  logical	  reasoning	  is	  not	  identical	  to	  human	  thinking.	  Synthetic	  biology	  and	  biological	  computing	  have	  in	  common	  that	  they	  work	  with	  living	  material.	  Engineers	   have	   started	   to	   build	   systems	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   existing	   organic	   elements	   or	   the	   use	   of	  mechanic,	   electronic	   or	   chemical	   components	   and	   organize	   them	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   they	   show	  organic	  qualities.	  Thereby	  the	  methodologies	  for	  the	  realization	  of	  biological	  machines	  not	  only	  run	  into	  deep	  ethical	  problems	  but	  also	  into	  fundamental	  problems	  concerning	  the	  range	  of	  the	  involved	  formal	   models.	   The	   strength	   of	   the	   formal	   approach	   is	   that	   it	   can	   capture	   human	   logics	   and	  experience	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  successive	  rules,	  but	  they	  are	  always	  external	  models.	  A	  cake	  recipe	  only	  includes	  instructions	  for	  handling	  the	  ingredients	  of	  the	  cake	  and	  the	  tools	  for	  making	  it.	  But	  if	  we	  exactly	   follow	   the	   given	   directions	   the	   cake	   will	   succeed.	   Although	   the	   recipe	   does	   not	   contain	  information	  about	  the	  flavor	  it	  nevertheless	  transports	  the	  taste	  of	  the	  cake.	  The	  taste	  of	  the	  cake	  is	  an	  interaction	  of	  the	  employed	  material	  and	  the	  gustatory	  nerves,	  not	  of	  the	  algorithm.	  Nevertheless,	  if	   we	   change	   the	   instructions	   the	   taste	   will	   be	   different.	   Algorithms	   are	   a	   powerful	   approach	   to	  transform	   human	   experience	   into	   mechanic	   actions	   in	   space	   and	   time.	   But	   algorithms	   are	   still	  reductions.	  Of	  course	  we	  always	  can	  augment	  algorithmic	  descriptions	  by	  additional	  formal	  models,	  e.g.	   a	   functional	   description	   of	   the	   interaction	  between	   taste	   buds	   and	   cake	   ingredients.	  We	  have	  learned	   that	   we	   need	   different	   models	   of	   abstraction	   to	   describe	   different	   phenomena.	   The	  fundamental	  presumption	  of	   the	  artificial	   life	  approach	   is	   that	   in	  the	  end	  any	  phenomenon	  can	  be	  grasped	  by	  adequate	  logical	  structures	  without	  any	  regress	  to	  subjective	  experience	  or	  other	  non-­‐formal	  qualities.	  But	   the	   formalizations	  we	  considered	  so	   far	  are	  objectifications	   that	  describe	   the	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systems	   from	   the	   outside.	   This	   perspective	   is	   sufficient	   for	   classical	   machines,	   but	   for	   biological	  machines	  this	  viewpoint	  needs	  to	  be	  complemented	  by	   inside	  perspectives	  and	  descriptions.	  Here	  we	   meet	   the	   established	   question	   in	   philosophy,	   the	   “What’s	   it	   like	   to	   be?”	   argument.	   The	  philosopher	  Thomas	  Nagel	  argues	  that	  an	  organism	  has	  conscious	  mental	  states,	  “if	  and	  only	  if	  there	  is	  something	  that	  it	  is	  like	  to	  be	  that	  organism	  –something	  it	  is	  like	  for	  the	  organism”	  [22].	  He	  also	  argues	   that	   the	   subjective	   aspect	   of	   experience	  will	   never	   be	   sufficiently	   explainable	   by	   objective	  methods.	  What	   philosophy	   calls	   qualia	  would	   therefore	  never	   be	  describable	   by	   reductive	   formal	  models.	   But	   for	   biological	   machines	   we	   nevertheless	   have	   to	   ask,	   whether	   we	   create	   subjective	  worlds	  for	  these	  machines,	  when	  we	  realize	  them	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  organisms	  and	  living	  materials.	  From	  biological	  research	  and	  especially	  physiological	  experiments	  we	  have	  learned	  long-­‐since	  that	  organisms	  live	  in	  different	  milieus	  (Umwelten),	  even	  though	  they	  share	  the	  same	  environment	  (see	  for	  example	  [18],	  [19]).	  The	  relationship	  of	  an	  organism	  with	  its	  environment	  is	  determined	  by	  a	   functional	  circle,	  which	   inseparably	  connects	   its	   inner	  world	  with	   the	  outside.	  Organisms	  create	  and	  reshape	  their	  Umwelt	  by	  interacting	  with	  the	  environment	  through	  their	  receptors	  and	  effectors,	  which	  are	  central	  components	  of	  a	  closed	  feedback	  circle.	  Since	  the	  receptors	  and	  effectors	  of	  various	  species	   and	   their	   typical	   environment	   are	   normally	   different,	   the	   Umwelten	   of	   organisms	   will	  consequently	  also	  differ	  drastically.	  Jakob	  von	  Uexküll	  showed	  that	  different	  species	  live	  in	  different	  worlds.	   He	   has	   argued	   that	   space	   and	   time	   are	   subjective	   products	   of	   organisms	   that	   depend	   on	  their	  physiological	  characteristics.	  The	  space	  of	  a	  worm	  is	  different	  to	  the	  space	  of	  a	  bird.	  While	  for	  a	  slug	  all	  movements	  in	  its	  Umwelt	  is	  faster	  than	  in	  our	  human	  perception	  the	  Umwelt	  of	  fish	  that	  live	  of	  fast	  moving	  prey,	  the	  environment	  is	  moving	  in	  slow	  motion	  compared	  to	  our	  human	  perception.	  The	  milieus	  of	  living	  beings	  are	  inseparably	  connected	  to	  their	  inner	  worlds.	  What	  do	  the	  milieus	  of	  biological	  machines	  look	  like?	  We	  are	  already	  able	  to	  realize	  new	  experiences	  of	  self-­‐perception	  with	  fairly	  primitive	  means.	  Installing	   a	   first-­‐person-­‐view-­‐flight-­‐kit	   on	   a	   model	   aircraft	   enables	   a	   subjective	   experience	   of	   an	  aviation-­‐perspective.	  Right	  in	  the	  moment	  when	  you	  feel	  up	  there	  in	  the	  aircraft	  you	  might	  suddenly	  spot	   yourself	   standing	   on	   a	   field	   deep	   down	   and	   perceive	   yourself	   as	   a	   spatially	   distributed	  individual.	   Those	   simple	   examples	  make	   clear	   that	  we	   have	   to	   reopen	   the	   relations	   between	   the	  Umwelt	   and	   the	   inner	  world	   for	   biological	  machines.	   Living	   beings	   normally	   have	   a	  well-­‐defined	  spatial	  border.	  But	  where	  is	  the	  border	  of	  a	  biological	  machine?	  What	  belongs	  to	  the	  machine	  and	  what	   to	   its	   environment?	  Any	  modular	   constructed	  machine	   can	  easily	  be	  extended	  by	  additional	  parts,	   even	  with	   parts	   that	   have	   their	   own	   local	   controlling	   elements	   and	   just	   communicate	  with	  already	   existing	   controlling	   device	   to	   achieve	   a	   certain	   overall	   function.	   The	   question	   of	   an	   exact	  border	  and	  of	  the	  inside-­‐outside-­‐relation	  is	  in	  the	  world	  of	  classical	  machines	  not	  least	  a	  question	  of	  perspective.	   What	   do	   such	   possibilities	   of	   reconfiguration	   mean	   for	   organism-­‐like	   machines?	   In	  what	  circumstances	  makes	  it	  sense	  to	  speak	  of	  the	  milieu	  of	  a	  machine,	  how	  is	  it	  constructed,	  what	  does	  it	  look	  like,	  and	  how	  is	  it	  connected	  to	  its	  construction	  plan?	  Since	  biological	  machines	  will	  be	  implemented	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   formal	   descriptions,	   we	   can	   expect	   that	   some	   of	   our	   well-­‐known	  mechanical	  features	  will	  coalesce	  with	  typical	  biological	  qualities.	  To	  give	  another	  simple	  example,	  we	   can	   ask	   whether	   biological	   machines	   will	   have	   an	   on-­‐off	   button.	   Or	   do	   they	   have	   to	   die	   like	  organisms?	   If	   life	   is	   a	   quality	   of	   the	   logical	   organization	   and	   not	   the	   applied	  material	   there	   is	   no	  reason	  not	  to	  abruptly	  stop	  a	  biological	  machine	  and	  proceed	  at	  exactly	  the	  same	  state	  somewhere	  later	   in	   time.	   One	   of	   the	   most	   important	   qualities	   of	   classical	   machines	   is	   their	   modular	   and	  hierarchical	   organization.	   Complex	   machines	   are	   designed	   and	   manufactured	   from	   standard	  elements	   and	   put	   together	   in	   hierarchical	   organized	   levels.	   The	   main	   difference	   to	   complex	  biological	  systems,	  which	  are	  also	  organized	  in	  modules	  and	  hierarchies,	   is	  their	  openness	  against	  exchangeability	   of	   its	   parts.	   What	   does	   it	   mean	   from	   the	   subjective	   perspective	   of	   a	   biological	  machine,	  if	  we	  are	  able	  to	  exchange	  receptors	  and	  effectors	  and	  thereby	  enforce	  new	  milieus?	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6.	  Conclusion	  	   Our	  machines	   begin	   to	   resemble	   living	   creatures.	   They	   are	   self-­‐assembling,	   self-­‐maintaining,	  inherently	  non-­‐terminating,	  massively	  parallel,	  stochastic,	  adaptive,	  and	  self-­‐modifying.	  For	  present	  production	  or	  computing	  machines,	  the	  task	  of	  programming	  can	  be	  described	  as	  finding	  a	  correct	  sequence	   of	   elementary	   operations	   so	   that	   a	   certain	   function	   is	   performed	   or	   in	   the	   case	   of	  computing	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  end-­‐states	  will	  be	  reached.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  programmer	  of	  a	  biological	  machine	   concentrates	   on	   the	   proper	   preparation	   of	   a	   self-­‐controlled	   biological	   process.	   Solving	  calculation	  problems	  with	   living	  materials	   is	  not	   a	   result	   of	   stepwise	   controlling	  a	  machine	   in	   the	  traditional	   sense	   but	   of	   reconfiguring	   the	   initial	   conditions	   of	   a	   biological	   system	   and	   its	  environment.	   From	   the	   material	   perspective	   a	   computer	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   object	   that	   by	  reconfiguration	  can	  implement	  different	  functions	  and	  thus	  produce	  different	  answers	  to	  different	  questions.	  What	  we	  are	   looking	   for	  are	  universally	   reconfigurable	  systems	   that	   for	  example	  allow	  for	  solving	  any	  computational	  problem	  or	  produce	  any	  achievable	  device.	  Architects,	   engineers	   and	   designers	   who	   are	   interested	   in	   self-­‐controlled	   production	  methodologies	   for	   everyday	   objects	   or	   buildings	   come	   across	   the	   same	   issues	   as	   biologists	   and	  computer	   scientists.	   It	   is	   obvious	   that	   different	   fields	   like	   biocomputing,	   biotechnology	   or	   the	  industrial	   production	   of	   “smart”	  materials	   face	   the	   same	   type	   of	   self-­‐referential	   logical	   problems.	  Therefore	   insights	   into	  human	  designed	  self-­‐referential	  processes	  can	  be	  generally	  applied	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  macroscopic	  as	  well	  as	  microscopic	  objects.	  Today	  our	  machines	  have	  sensors	  and	  actuators.	  Biological	  machines	  consequently	  will	  from	  a	  certain	   point	   have	   receptors	   and	  effectors.	   This	   reopens	  Uexküll’s	   question	   about	   the	   inner	  world	  and	   Umwelt	   of	   animals	   for	   machines.	   We	   will	   have	   to	   face	   the	   problem	   of	   what	   its	   like	   to	   be	   a	  machine.	  Research	  in	  artificial	  life	  and	  on	  biological	  machines	  start	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  life	  can	  be	  separated	  from	  its	  material	  basis	  and	  aliveness	  will	  finally	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  a	  property	  of	  the	  logical	  form.	  Many	  qualities	  of	  traditional	  machines	  like	  modularity,	  extendibility,	  hierarchical	  composition	  and	   others	   are	   also	   elementary	   qualities	   of	   these	   logical	   forms.	   The	   essential	   point	   of	   biological	  machines	  is	  not	  that	  we	  just	  reconstruct	  and	  modify	  some	  well-­‐known	  lifeforms	  on	  an	  artificial	  basis,	  but	  that	  our	  technical	  society	  enters	  a	  next	  level.	  It	  is	  not	  familiar	  life	  that	  is	  re-­‐created,	  like	  it	  was	  not	   intelligence	   that	   has	   been	   re-­‐created	   by	   AI,	   but	   new	   forms	   of	   abstracted	   and	   functionalized	  qualities	   of	   the	   living.	   It	   seems	   to	   be	   obvious	   that	   in	   the	   future	  we	  will	   face	  many	  machines	   that	  show	  a	  mixture	  of	  mechanic	  and	  organic	  qualities.	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